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The Relevance of Benefit: 
Competing Notions of 
What Justice Requires1 
Gary Atkinson 
The aUfhor o( Ihis arlic/e is all assislallf pro/i'ssor o(phi/o.\·o/Jhr al 51 . 
Tholl1as Co//ege. 51. Pau/. Millnesota. 
Prologue 
One m ight have to think back as far as 1968 and the shootings of Martin 
Luther King and Robert Kennedy to find a death which so gained the 
attention and ire of the nation as that of a nameless male infant in 
Bloomington, I ndiana. The child died April 15, 1982 as a result of a 
decision by parents and phys ician not to remove an obstruction in his 
esophagus blocking food from entering his stomach. Although the 
blockage could have been corrected by relatively simple surgery, the 
procedure was not performed because the infant was believed afflicted 
with Down's syndrome. The child lived six days without food or Ouids, 
and died before an appeal could reach the United States Supreme Court. 
alleging that the refusal of treatment represented a denia P of the infant's 
constitutional right of due process. The evidence indicated that the infant 
almost certainly did have Down's syndrome. But chromosome studies , the 
only means of being absolutely certa in of the diagnosis, were not done. 
Apparently in response to the controversy surrounding this infant's 
death, the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Health and Human 
Services (H H S) issued May 18, 1982 a "N otice to Health Care Providers." 
The "Notice" warned that it was a violation of Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to withhold food or medical treatment from a 
handicapped in fant if "( I) the withholding is based on the fact that the 
infant is handicapped; and (2) the handicap does not render the treatment 
or nutritional sustenance medically contraindicated." The relevant part of 
Section 504 states that "no otherwise qualified handicapped individual .... 
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be su bjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." The "Notice" 
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warned that failure to respect 504 cou ld result in loss of federal funds for 
the offending institution. 
On March 7.1983 the Office of the Secretary of H HS issued an " Interim 
Fi nal Rule" wh ich ca me to be known as the" Ba by Doe Rule" owing to its 
perceived connection with the Bloomington "Infant Doe" case . The 
purpose of the" Rule" was to add to regulations implementing Section 504: 
(I) the protections afforded handicapped infants were to be brought to the 
attention of hea lth professionals and others who would be likel y to know 
of the occurrence of possible vio lations : (2) speedier in vestigation of 
alleged vio lations was provided for . since the requirement of a 10-day 
waiting period in the 1973 Act would often preclude action in time to save 
the lives of infants being discriminatorily withheld from treatment; and 
(3) round-the-clock access to hospital records to assure compliance was 
required. 
Since the stated ultimate purpose of the "Interim Final Rule" was to 
sa ve the li ves of handicapped infants . and since the Secretary believed that 
those who had knowledge of violation of Section 504 might lack 
opportunity to provide immediate notice to federal officials. the "Ru le' 
required that a notice be posted in delivery. maternity. and pediatric wards 
giving the relevant information regarding Section 504 and declaring that 
"discriminatory failure to feed and care for handicapped infant s in this 
facility is prohibited by federal law." The notice also was to list the number 
of what came to be called the "Baby Doe Hotline," a toll-free number open 
24 hours a day where HHS could be reached by anyone "having 
knowledge that a handicapped infant is being discriminatorily denied food 
or customary medical care." 
The "Interim Final Rule" took effect March 22, 1983. It received wide 
attention and vehement criticism. particularly from the medical 
profession. Suit was brought in federal court to block implementation of 
the rule. and a stay was issued April 22. In response to t~e opposition from 
the medical profession , the Secretary issued, on July 5.1983. a new set of 
"Proposed Rules." Instead of setting a date on which the rules were to be 
implemented. the document merely specified that comments on the 
proposal be submitted by September 8. The "Proposed Rules," contained 
the major points of the "Interim Final Rule," but added the requirement 
that state child protective agencies be involved to assure greater 
compliance with state laws prohibiting child abuse and neglect. 
On Jan. 12. 1984, the Secretary of H HS issued its "Final Rule" to take 
effect Feb. 13. As a result of nearly 17,000 comments submitted in response 
to the "Proposed Rules." a few changes were made regarding the required 
notice and certain enforcement procedures. Also, greater attention was 
given to the possible usefulness of Infant Care Review Committees in 
developing appropriate standards and in making decisions about specific 
cases. But the fundamental principles embodied in the "Interim Final 
Rule" and the "Proposed Rules" remained unchanged. 
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This paper exa min es th e H HS doc umen ts in o rd er to e x plicate the 
Reagan administration's understanding of the re4uirements of just ice for 
the defective newborn. Although the guidelines ma y, in fact. be th e best 
means available for assuri ng that justice is done, it will be argued that the 
underlying eth ica l principlcs arc inade4uate in failing to take acco unt of 
morally re levant conside rations that are defensible in justice and 
sanc ti o ned by t he C hu rch's offic ia l teachings. 
What Justice Requires 
This pape r assumes, w ith o ut argume nt. th a t newborns fall wit hin the 
scope of jus ti ce a nd th a t th e age ofa born human be in g is by itself no more 
m o ra ll y relevant than race, sex, IQ, or physical strength or beauty.2lfthis 
pos it ion be granted. then it ma y seem obvious that a serious injusti ce was 
done in Bloomington. T hi s paper argues for that view. But let us begin by 
co ns id c rin g how one might. w hile admitting th a t infa nts fa ll within th e 
scope of justice, offe r o ne of two dcfenses for th e way Infant Doe was 
treated. 
First. one cou ld appeal to what ma y be ca lled an "absolute 4ual it y-of-
li fe" sta ndard , holding th at there are certain lives so low in 4uality that th e 
person wo uld be be tt e r offdead , and that one might be doing him an ac tual 
injustice by a ll owing him to li ve ( i.e .. the asse rtion underl yin g "wrongful 
li fe" suits). T hen o ne would have to c laim th a t a person with Down's 
Synd rome meets whatever cond iti o ns t here a re for possess i ng such a 
" negat ive 4uality o f life." 
Set as ide th e objecti on that no co nfirmi ng tests were undertaken to 
ve rify the diagnosis of Down's sy ndro me in the case of Baby Doe . Set 
a s id e. too, the po int th a t Down's syndrome displays considerable 
variation in it s ex press ion fr om severe re tardati on to borderline normal. 
with the vas t majority falling in th e range of moderate retarda ti on. There 
rema in two genera l o bj ec ti o ns to suc h an approach. , 
T he re is one serious objection w hich ca n be brought aga inst anI" 
absolut e 4ualit y-of- life standard: th e re is, in fa ct. no conse nsus a bou t what 
makes a life not worth li vin g . Thejudgment th a t a give n indi vidua l's life is 
not wo rth li vin g is subjective a nd idiosyncratic in the extreme. It is a 
judgment that cou ld be called "ideo logica l" in ex press ing a particular 
conv ict ion regarding the meaning of human existe nce. What o ne person 
finds tolerab le another finds int o le ra ble. Seco nd , e mpirica l studies of 
indi viduals actua ll y afnicted with Down's syndro me show that they do not 
share th e view th a t life with th at condition is no t worth living. 
Thus, what appeals to an absolute quality-of-life standard comes to in 
thi s case is a position favo rin g the kil lin g of a no n-conse nting huma n being 
by a second pe rso n usin g a 4ua lit y-of-life sta ndard the victim himse lf 
would be unlik e ly to sha re. If we examine what justice requires for a 
mome nt from a Kantian pe rspecti ve and if we were to conduct the thought 
ex pe riment of d es igning rules for a soc iet y in which we are to be born and 
li ve, we would ce rt a inl y no t a d o pt a rule pe rmitting such ki lling. The 
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adoption of this rule will be seen to be even more unjustifiable when we 
reflect on the possibility that the person making such negative quality-of-
life judgments for the helpless individual might be in the position of being 
required to care for him if he is not killed. For example. the parent who 
uses an absolute quality-of-life standard to judge his chi ld 's life not worth 
living is precisely the one who would incur the cost and other burdens of 
care if the child does not die. The possibilities for bias and gross abuse are 
manifest. 
An alternative defense of t he Bloomington case would be to admit this 
serious moral objection to the use of any absolute quality-of-life standard. 
at least when it is imposed on someone who has not already expressed his 
views . Still , one could maintain that the objection is considerably lessened 
when appeal is made to a "relative quality-of-life" standard. The point of 
such a standard is simply to make explicit what we all recognize: that 
physical and mental normalcy is preferable to physical impairment of 
mental retardation, that it is better to walk on two legs than to get around 
in a wheelchair, better to have the mental capacity to read a book than not 
to have it. The reason why from a Kantian perspective the use of such a 
standard is not unjust is that it is one to which, within rough limits, we all 
can agree. 
What follows from the use of a relative quality-of-life standard is the 
conviction that we benefit a person more by restoring him to normal health 
and functioning than if we leave him in a more or less seriously impaired 
condition. This must be distinguished from the view that we do the person 
no good at all. That would be a judgment expressive of an absolute 
quality-of-life standard. It is one thing to say that a mentally defective 
individual has a low quality of life. It is quite another to suggest that the 
individual's quality of life is zero or negative. For instance, using a relative 
quality-of-life standard , we would have to say about Karen Ann Quinlan 
that her quality of life was low and that we were doinll her relatively little 
good in keeping her alive . But , since Karen herself did not te ll us, we could 
not say that we were doing her absolutely no good at all. The issue here is 
not the truth of these judgments but the justice of acting on them when 
their acceptance by the party most involved is in doubt. 
One Step to Complete Defense 
Now there remains one more step to complete the second defense of the 
non-treatment of the Bloomington Baby. This is the principle that the help 
we are required to render in justice normally depends on four features: (I) 
the significance of the good that can reasonably be expected; (2) the degree 
of harm caused by the rendering of aid for the person being thus "aided"; 
(3) the degree of burden that must be assumed by those providing aid; and 
(4) the nature of the relationships among the parties. For instance , justice 
may require us to stop and render aid to someone involved in a serious 
accident , but we would not be required in justice to help him change a flat 
tire. A surgeon may be required to operate on a patient, but not if there is 
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no anesthetic ava ilable. Although we ma y not ha ve a duty injustice to save 
a strange r's life at the ri sk of our own, we might have one if the only cost of 
d oing so is tha t of being late for a n appointment. And we would bla me a 
pa rent who refuses to pay the cost of educating his child , though we would 
not blame a stranger for refusing. 
Use of relative quality-of-life standa rd also is sanctioned by 
authoritative Church teachings . Pope Pi us X II's famous 1957 statement 
on the "Prolongation of Life" makes it clear that the Christian duty to 
preserve life depends on the context: 
But no rma lly one is held to use only ord ina ry mea ns - acco rding to 
circumsta nces of persons. places. t imes a nd culture - tha t is to say. mea ns 
tha t d o not invo lve a ny grave burden fo r o nese lf or a nother. A more stri ct 
o bligati o n wo uld be too burdenso me for m os t men a nd would re nde r the 
att a inme nt o f the higher. more important good too difficult . Life. hea lth . a ll 
te mpora l acti vit ies a re in fac t subordina ted to spiri tua l ends'" 
The idea of not being obliged to assume a "grave burden" in prolonging 
life receives expansion in the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Fa ith's 1980 "Declaration on Euthanasia." Instead of employing the 
phrase "ordinary means" to refer to obligatory therapies, the "Declaration" 
focuses on the distinction between "proportionate" and "dispropor-
tionate" means: 
It will be poss ible to ma ke a correc t j udg ment as to the mea ns by stud ying the 
type of trea tme nt used . it s degree of co mplex ity o r ri sk. its cost a nd the 
poss ibi liti es of using it . a nd co mpa ring these elements with the res ult t ha t ca n 
be ex pec ted . tak ing into acco unt the sta te of the sick perso n a nd hi s o r her 
phys ical a nd moral resources. 
It is a lso permiss ible to ma ke do with the no rmal means that medicine ca n 
offer. Therefore one ca nnot impose o n a nyone the obliga ti o n to have recourse 
to a technique which is a lread y in use but which ca rries a ri sk o r is 
burdensome. Such should be co nside red as a n acceptance of the human 
co ndition . or a wish to avoid the a pplica tion of a medica~ procedure 
di spro portiona te to the result s tha t ca n be e x pected . o r a des ire not to impose 
excessive ex pense on the famil y or co mmunity· 
The language of "means that do not involve any grave burden for oneself 
or another" in the 1957 statement becomes "a medical procedure 
disproportionate to the results that can be expected" in the 1980 
document. But three points seem clear in both statements: (I) that 
decisions regarding the obligatoriness of certain treatments are context-
dependent; (2) that the burdens imposed on others of providing treatment 
may legitimately be taken into consideration; and (3) that the degree of 
expected benefit to the patient is another morally relevant consideration . 
The Church's official teaching is perfectly consistent with secular notions 
of justice in this regard. 
Thus, on both secular theories of justice and historical Catholic 
principles , the obligation one has to preserve another's life is relative to a 
proportion between the benefits expected and the burdens imposed . And if 
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appeal to proportional benefit can indeed be justified, then a defense of 
letting Infant Doe die could be offered as follows. A rejection of an 
absolute 4uality of life standard prevents us from saying that we harm 
Infant Doe by letting him li ve. But we can say that we will do him less good 
by preserving his life than by preserving the life of a completely normal 
child. If we join with th is the point that caring for a child with Down's 
synd ro me ca n be pa rt ieula rly onerous bot h for pa rents a nd society, we ca n 
see how one might claim that the ratio of benefit to cost is too low to 
ma ndate treatment. Society clea rly has no obligation to spend $ I 0,000,000 
to restore a human being to normal functioning. Nor do we as a society 
have the responsibility to expend the effort necessary to raise a child with 
Down's syndrome. 
It bears noting that this argument about what is required injustice is not 
necessarily utilitarian. It is not even necessarily consequentialist. if that 
term be taken to refer to the thesis that consequences alone matter. This 
argument does not maintain that allowing the child to die is justified 
because overall social utility will be thereby maximized. Nor is it argued 
that the benefit to society is too small to justify the expenditures. Rather, 
the claim is that the expected benefit to the child himself is too small 
relative to the cost to require treatment. I f one rejects the propriety of this line 
of reasoning, it will be difficult if not impossible to escape the conclus ion 
that just ice does indeed require the spend ing of $1 0,000,000 to save a life . 
The major defect with the argument in this case is not its form or the 
moral relevance of the considerations it advances, but s impl y the 
pIa usibility of its principal premise, that the expected benefit to the child is 
too low. given the burden of care, to require treatment. Caring for a child 
with Down's syndrome is no doubt more difficult than for the average 
ch ild, but how many physically and mentally normal children for a 
number of reasons impose a burden on their parents and society equal to 
or greater than that posed by children with Down's syndrome? And as for 
benefit. individ uals with Down's syndrome seem to value their own lives as 
much as normal people value theirs. 
I f it be 0 bjected t ha t such i nd ivid uals a re mentally too deficient to make 
correct judgments in this area, we might well ask how that assertion could 
be defended. And we might note the many serious ly physically 
handicapped persons who find great value in their lives. A Christian will 
recognize the defective child as the object of God's enduring love. And 
even from a secu lar viewpoint, a spirit of tolerance, while recognizing the 
desirability of physical and mental normalcy, will not be quick to denigrate 
the goodness of persons' lives, especially when their possessors find them 
good. And finally, from a Kantian perspective, it simply does not appear 
credible that an individual who sets aside his own idiosyncratic va lues 
should choose for a society in whic h he was to be born and live, a policy 
that would a ll ow infants with Down's syndrome to die at the wishes of 
their parents. An adu lt with a full formed set of idiosyncratic values might 
very well honestly say, "If I were an infant with Down's syndrome I would 
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not want to li ve ." but justice cannot permit th e imposition of such va lues 
o n ano ther person. 
The " Baby Doe" Guidelines: What Justice Does Not Require 
The la nguage of a ll the H H S documents is the la ng uage of 
nond iscrimina ti o n. The "Proposed Rules" are filled with such refere nces. 
For ins ta nce. there is niention of the need for "exped iti ous investigation 
a nd immedia te e nfo rceme nt ac ti o n when necessary to protect a 
ha ndi ca pped infant w hose life is endange red by discrimination."5 The 
d oc u me nt decla res tha t th e "d isc ri m i na tory fa i I ure of hea It h ca re providers 
to feed a handicap ped infant or to provide m edica l treatment esse ntial t o 
co rrec t a life-threa tening co nditi o n" is a vio la ti o n o f Section 504 o f the 
Rehabilitation Act whi ch "requires that hea lth se rvices be prov ided to the 
ha ndicap ped o n a bas is o f equalit y with th ose not ha ndi ca pped' ". 
T he key to th e Reaga n ad mini strat ion's pos iti o n a nd a n indicat io n of 
whe re it s weak ness lies ca n be found in this paragraph : 
Section 504 is in essence al1 clJual treatment. nondiscr imination st"l ndard . 
Congress patterned Section 504 on T it le V I of the C i"il Right s Aet. ,,"hi eh 
prohibits discrimination based on ra ce. Programs or activities rece iving fede ra l 
fina ncial ass ista nce ma y not deny a hCl1cfil o r sen'icc so lely o n grounds of a 
r c rso n's handicap.ju st as they ma y not deny a hCJ1cfit or se n "icc O il grou nd s o f 
a person's race, l, 
This a na logy betwee n the handicap ped pe rso n a nd th e pe rs on 
discriminated against on th e basi s of ra ce is revealing . If we think racial 
di scrim inati o n wrong. it is because we assume e ithe r (I) that the service 
be ing denied members of th e di sfavored race would be a t leas t ro ughl y as 
be neficia l to them as it is to th e perso ns rece iving th e service o r (2) that 
the re ex ists a n alternative se rv ice which would be as va luable. And we also 
think thi s discriminatory be ha v io r wro ng partl y beca use it results fr o m a 
spirit of hat e or ca llous indifference towards the di s fav~'ed race rather 
tha n for so me m o ra lly defensible reaso n. The co ntention that a se rvice 
d e nied members of one race wo uld not benefi t th e m and ca nn o t be 
substituted fo r by an a lterna ti ve service wo uld . if true . be a n effective 
res ponse to an y charge of racia l di scriminat io n. Thus . if a n analogy 
between racial discrimination and the withho lding of ca re for han d ica pped 
infants is to be susta ined . it will need to be shown (I) that the re exists at 
least so me be neficia l se rvice being de nied ha ndica pped infants and (2) that 
d enial of the se rvice has no mora ll y defensible ex pla nati o n. 
The hi story of judicia I int er preta tion of Secti o n 504 shows a n awa reness 
of the first point. That sec tion contained refe re nce to an "o th e rwise 
qu a lifi ed ha ndica pped indi vidua l" without a n ex pla nat ion of th e 
s ig nifica nce o f the phrase "otherwise qualified." A 1979 S upre me Co urt 
d ecis ion cla rified thi s lang ua ge by d ecla ring such a perso n to be o ne 
capable of be nefitting. in spite of his ha ndica p. from the prog ram offered . 
The iss ue. the n . as Section 504 is a ppli ed to th e care of ha ndicap ped 
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infants. is which infants are "otherwise qualified." i.e .. are capable of 
benefitting from the services being offered to others. but denied them. 
The position of the Reagan administration on this point is clear. The 
"Final Rule" states: 
In the co nt ext of recei"ing medical care. the ahility to henefit for a 
handicapped person is the ahility to hencfit medically from the treatment or 
sen'ices. If thc handicapped person is ahlc to hencfit medica ll y from the 
t rea t ment or sen'ice. in s pite of t he person's prescnt or ant ici pol ted p hysica I or 
men tal impairments. the indi, 'idua l is "otherwi se qualified" to rcce iyc that 
treatment or sen'ice. and it may not he denicd solely on the has is of the 
handicap. 
The refore. the analytical framc\\'ork undcr the sta tutc for applying sect ion 
S04 in the con tc xt of health care for handicapped infants is that health ca re 
prm'idcrs may not. solei,' on the hasis of prese nt or anticipated physical or 
mental impairme nts of an infant. withhold trea tment or nourishment from the 
in fant who. in spit c of such impairments. will medically hcncfit from the 
treatment o r nourishmcnt. 7 
This does not mean. though . that handicapped infants must be given all 
treatments that would ordinarily be provided normal children: 
These interpretati ve guidelines make clear that futile treatments or 
treatmcnts that will do no more than temporaril y prolong the act of dying of a 
terminally ill infant are not required hy sec tion S04. and that. in determining 
whether certain possihle trea tments will he medicall y heneficial to an infant. 
reasonahle medical judgments in selecting a mong alternative courses of 
treatment will he respected .' 
Although it would be permissible. for example. not to engage in surgery 
to prolong the life of an anencephalic infant who will die soon. whatever is 
done. treatment may not be withheld because of cost ("cost should not be a 
determinative factor in deciding upon treatment for seriously impaired 
newborns")9 or because of the burden of care imposed on the family 
("excluding consideration of the negative effects of an impaired child's life 
on other persons' ").10 , 
Now there is much that is right with the position of the Reagan 
administration. I n spite of some self-serving statements from the medical 
profession. there does exist a significant bias against handicapped infants 
which renders them victims of unjust undertreatment. It is possible to 
disagree about the frequency of such occurrence. But how many of those 
who contend that the prob lem is minor would be content with the remark 
that political oppression in America n society constitutes a minor problem 
beca use there are so few genuinely political prisoners in our jails? The very 
legitimacy of the American system rests upon its concern for justice/or al/. 
And although there are limits to what any human institution can be 
expected to accomplish, we cannot afford to take lightly any institutional 
injustice - injustice which is perpetrated through our institutions rather 
than in spite of them. 
But there is a weakness, too, in the Administration's position, one 
suggested by the analogy drawn with racial injustice. We assume that 
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providing second-rate schools for blacks is wrong because we believe not 
only that they could benefit from better schools but also that not providing 
better schools results from racist attitudes. In other words . we oppose 
second-rate schools for blacks as unjust because we think that there is no 
morally defensible reason for not providing better ones. 
The Reagan administration's position comes close to the suggestion that 
there is 110 morally defensible reason for withholding from the 
handicapped infant medically beneficial treatment which would ordinarily 
be given to the normal child. But it would seem that the assumption ought 
to be that whatever considerations are deemed legitimate within a general 
theory of justice arc also defensible IIll/talis II/walldis when dealing with 
the care of infants. defective or normal. Consider once again the four 
reasons cited above with possible applications to pediatric medicine: (I) no 
benefit at all can reasonably be expected from the proposed therapy (e.g., 
the infant will die soon whateve r is done) : (2) the benefit is too low to 
justify the harm done (e.g .. a Tay-Saehs child requires cardiac surgery): (3) 
the cost of rendering aid is too heavy to require its imposition (e.g .. the 
child needs a liver transplant in order to live): and (4) the relationship 
among the parties does not impose a given duty (e.g .. an overworked 
surgeon refuses to perform an operation on an infant not his patient) . 
These arc legitimate considerations within a general theory of justice, and 
though they no doubt create special problems in the practice of pediatric 
medicine . this is no reason for thinking them inappropriate or unjust. 
Surely the burdcn or proor ought to be on those who admit the general 
moral rclevanec ' of these considerations but deny their acceptability in 
determining the ethically mandated care or the defective child. 
It may be objected that no one is upset over decisions not to engage in 
cardiac surgery for a child with Tay-Saehs or not to seek a liver transplant 
ror an anenccphalie infant. What is bothersome because unjust, are 
decisions likc thc one in Bloomington. to withhold simple surgery for 
children with Down's syndrome. But ir one examines the cases which 
act ually generate the greatest moral uncertainty as opposed to controversy 
(egregiously wrongful acts are orten highly controversial), one rinds that 
such cases are not instances of withholding food and fluids from children 
with Down's syndrome. The cases which create the most moral uncertainty 
are precisely ones in which there exist general moral considerations favoring 
discontinuance of treatment. but for which the H HS guidelines would 
seem to mandate continued therapy. 
A Case 
To illustrate the point that the Reagan administration's requirements 
may conflict with general considerations of justice, consider the following 
true case. one which is unfortunately not atypical. 
An infant (let us call him Robert) was admitted to a neonatal intensive 
care unit (NICU) shortly after birth. He weighed 960 gramsat birth, with a 
heart rate. respiration . and blood pressure of zero and a body temperature 
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of 93 degrees. He was diagnosed as ha ving perinatal asphyxia for an 
undetermined length of time. Robert has been at the N I CU for more than 
three months . During that time he has experienced recurrent periods of 
slow heartbeat (bradycardia) and loss of spontaneous breathing (apnea). 
He has been placed on and taken off a respirator severa l times. Robert has 
a bulging fontanelle and was diagnosed as hav ing had an intracranial 
hemorrhage. A CT-scan and an EEG have revealed some abnormalities. 
Robert neither sucks nor swallows. I n the middle of the fourth month after 
birth , a neurological examination shows probability of "significa nt 
neurological involvement." The best the neurologist is willing to haza rd 
for Robert is that he will be of low normal intelligence. The child has had 
seizures and was placed on phenobarbital until it was discontinued when 
the doses became toxic. Use of the respirator has damaged the child's lungs, 
and there is some fear that continued use of the tube through which he is 
fed will cause constriction of the trachea. Robert has contractures which 
make a neurological examination difficult. He has developed scurvy and 
rickets. The neurological examination suggested that the child might grow 
out of his apnea and bradycardia. The seizures appear likely to continue 
but may be partially controllable. None of the attending professionals 
believe Robert is dying, though his overall prognosis is "very poor." His 
mother seems willing to take Robert into her home, but she is young and 
unmarried a nd lives with her mother in a house with no running water, 
phone or electricity. A phone is available at the home of relatives, about 
one mile away. They have a car, but it is unreliable. The social worker on 
Robert's case doubts whether the mother will be able to provide the 
medical care that would become necessary in an emergency. 
The H HS guidelines maintain it to be a violation of Section 504 for a 
recipient of federal funds 
to withho ld from a handicapped infant nutritional sustenance or medical or 
surgical treatment required to correct a life-threatening co nliition if: 
(I) the withholding is based on the fact that the infant is handicapped ; and 
(2) the handicap does not render the treatment or nutritional sustenance 
medicall y co ntraindicated. " 
If Robert develops apnea while he is off the respirator, should we place him 
back on? Do we have a legal or moral duty to do so? 
We may begin to answer these questions by examining them from the 
point of view of the Reagan administration. We would first need to know 
whether Robert counts as an "otherwise qualified handicapped infant." It 
would be most implausible to suggest that he does not. Robert is not dying, 
though the respirator is occasionally necessary to prolong his life. The fact 
that Robert only occasionally needs respiratory support indicates that his 
lungs are not irreversibly damaged. He may grow out of his periods of 
apnea and bradycardia. Is use of the respirator "medically contra-
indicated"? No. It is true that the respirator may have impaired Robert's 
lungs, but this is common and recovery is quite possible. The alternative to 
use of a respirator now is a quick death by asphyxiation. If we were to 
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decide not to resuscitate Robert should he once again develop apnea , 
would this be based on the fact that Robert is handicapped? [t must be. Use 
of the respirator is standard practice in N[CU's. Only his poor prognosis 
for mental normalcy and the difficulties his care is likely to encounter at 
home, not any terminal illness , explain why anyone would think twice 
about withholding treatment. Thus, it appears inescapable that, according 
to the Reagan administration guidelines, not returning Robert to the 
respirator would be a violation of Section 504. 
Bu are we morally obliged to re-institute respirator therapy? A case can 
be made for a negative answer, one consistent with Church teaching. First 
of all, we need not and should not maintain that Robert's life is not worth 
living. We would simply say that we had already done enough for Robert, 
more than could be demanded by justice. The prospect for significant 
benefit to Robert is slim. The burdens already assumed by the provision of 
care are large, to say nothing of the suffering to which we have subjected 
Robert. The ratio of expected benefit (Robert's) to cost (both for Robert 
and others) is too small for treatment to be required in justice. To deny 
legitimacy of considering the proportion of burdens to expected benefits in 
the care of defective newborns would be (I) to assign them a special status 
possessed by no other human being and (2) at the same time to subject 
them to the danger of requiring painful therapies no matter how poor the 
prognosis. 
Without suggesting that the Church's principles require the non-
treatment of Robert, we may still insist that nothing in the Church's 
position requires treatment , either. As Pope Pius remarked , life and all 
temporal activities are subordinated to spiritual ends. We owe Robert, as 
we own any helpless person, the type of care we would think obligatory in 
our own case. But since we have no duty to impose excessive burdens on 
ourselves or others to preserve our own life, there are limits to what can in 
justice be imposed on us for the care of others. , 
The Reagan administration has acted to remedy a serious injustice 
occurring in the care of the most helpless among us. Reasonable people 
may well disagree on the best way of seeing that justice be done. This paper 
has not been concerned to evaluate the workability of the guidelines, but to 
examine the defensibility of the underlying principles. It may very well be 
the case that in order to assure that injustices like the one in Bloomingon 
not occur, the procedures to be implemented must exclude relative quality-
of-life assessments or consideration of the burden of care for family and 
society. But even if this were true, it is a suggestion that needs argument 
and should not be assumed at the outset. Also , it is one thing to say that 
certain morally acceptable principles cannot be applied in a given context 
because of their unworkability or danger of abuse. It is quite another to 
maintain that those principles are themselves improper and that appeal to 
them displays a poor sense of justice. This paper has been concerned to 
show simply that considerations excluded by the HHS documents are 
defensible within a general theory of justice and are consistent with Church 
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teaching. The wisdom of their employment within the context of perinatal 
medicine has not been addressed here. 
REFERENCES 
I. This paper is based partly on research supported by the Program on Human Values 
and Ethics at the Univers it y of Tennessee Center for the Health Sciences at Memphis and 
the Nat ional Endowment for the Humanities. grant #Ed-32672-78-652. 
2. For a neo-Kantian theoretical framework which ascribes to infants the status of moral 
persons. sec John Rawls. A TllI'orr or JlIs/in' (Harvard University Press. 1971) pp. 
505-510. For an a pplication of the principles of a liberal society to the care of newborns see 
Germain Grise7 and Joseph M. Boyle. Jr .. UrI' and De(1/h " 'i/h Lihenr and JU.Hice 
(University of Notre Dame Press. 1979). 
J. Reprinted in The Pope Speaks. Vo l. 4 (1958). pp. 383-398 . 
4. Recently rep rint ed in a report of th President's Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine a nd Biomedical and Behavioral Research entitled Deciding IV 
Fo"'go Lire-Su.l'laining Trea/l17el7l: E1hical. Medical. and Legal Issues in Trea/l17el7l 
Decisions (U .S. Government Printing Office. 1983). pp. 300-7. 
5. Federal Regis/er. Vol. 48. No. 129 (July 5. 1983). pp. 30846-30852. p. 30846. 
6.lhid 
7. FedertilRegister. Vol. 49. No.8 (.Ian . 12.1984). pp. 1622-1654. p. 1630. 
8. Ihid. 
9. 01'. cit .. p. 1644. 
10. 01'. cit .. p. 1630. 
I I. 48 Federal Register. p. 30851. 
86 Linacre Quarterly 
